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Abstract 
This paper examines the overall variability of Australian banks￿ credit risk during 
the 1990s. It assesses the extent to which this overall variability can be explained 
by variability in the level of banks￿ aggregate credit risk over time, or alternatively, 
by variation in the average credit risk of different banks. The ability of 
macroeconomic variables to explain movements in bank risk is also considered. 
Discussion of banks￿ credit risk is supplemented with analysis of the rate of return 
on assets earned by banks since the 1960s. While most of the variability in banks￿ 
credit risk and profitability is due to differences between banks, macroeconomic 
variables are found to exert a strong influence on banks￿ risk and profitability. The 
share of interest payments in the corporate and household sectors￿ income, real 
credit growth and property prices are most strongly correlated with banks￿ risk and 
profitability.  
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 THE EFFECT OF MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON 
BANKS￿ RISK AND PROFITABILITY 
Marianne Gizycki 
1. Introduction 
The principal source of banking fragility is credit risk: the risk of loss resulting 
from counterparty default. This paper compares the relative contributions of 
interbank variation and the variation through time to the overall variability in 
Australian banks￿ credit risk. A simple model, which imposes the constraint that 
each bank responds to macroeconomic developments in the same way, is used to 
examine the ability of macroeconomic variables to explain movements in 
individual banks￿ risk. Since consistent data on banks￿ credit risk are only available 
since 1990, discussion of banks￿ credit risk during the 1990s is supplemented with 
analysis of the rate of return on assets earned by banks since the 1960s. 
While most of the variability in banks￿ credit risk and profitability is due to 
differences between banks, macroeconomic variables are found to exert a strong 
influence on each bank￿s risk and profitability. In particular, the share of interest 
payments in the corporate and household sectors￿ income, real credit growth and 
property prices are most strongly correlated with banks￿ risk and profitability.  
These findings offer support to three strands of theoretical analysis of the 
interaction between financial institutions and the real economy. Firstly, the effect 
of real credit growth on banks￿ credit risk and profitability is in line with the view 
that difficulties in monitoring bank performance can lead banks to weaken their 
credit standards in times of rapid expansion of aggregate credit. Secondly, the 
observed relation between property prices and bank risk supports the proposition 
that the difficulties banks have in monitoring borrowers￿ viability (and the effect of 
collateral values in signalling borrower credit worthiness) play an important role in 
determining the supply of credit. Thirdly, our results are consistent with theoretical 
analysis suggesting that cyclicality in agents￿ preferences for gearing is an 
important influence on bank risk and profitability. 2 
 
 
The following section discusses the potential sources of variation in banking risk 
and profitability. The third section presents an analysis of banks￿ credit risk during 
the 1990s. A longer-run analysis of bank profitability is presented in the fourth 
section. Section five concludes. 
2.  Sources of Variation in Banking Risk and Performance 
2.1 Variation  Between  Banks 
Differences between banks in risk exposure and profitability arise from two broad 
sources: the different operating strategies that banks choose to adopt and the 
efficiency achieved by each institution. 
Each bank￿s operating strategy has three main elements: its scale, the scope of its 
operations and its risk appetite. A significant body of empirical work suggests that 
the scale economies in banking are not large, thus performance is not strongly 
related to the scale of each bank￿s operations (Calomiris and Karceski 1998). 
Nevertheless, differences across banks in the scale of their operations will result in 
different levels of diversification and thus different levels of riskiness.  
Economies of scope present a trade-off between the benefits of specialisation (for 
example, a simple product range allows for ease of administration) and the benefits 
from diversification and cross-selling. In seeking to maximise efficiency in making 
loans and related customer-servicing activities, banks tend to focus on areas where 
they believe they have a comparative advantage (Allen 1997). This leads to 
concentrations by geography, industry, demographics and other market 
characteristics. Such differences in the scope of banks￿ activities will lead to 
differences in bank riskiness and profitability as economic conditions vary across 
different regions and industrial sectors. 
While the scale and scope of operations of each bank will influence its overall risk, 
banks may also separately manage their risk profile. The development of financial 
techniques such as securitisation, credit derivatives and other financial derivatives 
has enhanced banks￿ capacity to determine their risk profile independent of their 
underlying business activities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2000). 3 
 
 
The ability of managers to achieve efficient use of inputs will influence   
the dispersion in risk and performance across banks. In particular, inefficient 
institutions have a tendency to carry higher risk (Eisenbeis, Ferrier and   
Kwan 1999). This may be because poor management quality results in both poor 
resource and risk management. Alternatively, individual institutions may attempt 
to compensate for their inefficiency by taking on greater risk. 
There is an extensive literature that seeks to identify which individual-bank factors 
best predict bank performance. Since the bulk of this research has been carried out 
in the US (with its large population of banks and long history of bank failures), the 
work mostly focuses on modelling the likelihood of bank failure. In this work, 
capital adequacy, earnings and impaired assets are found to be the most useful 
indicators of the probability of failure (Demirg￿c-Kunt 1989). In addition, rapid 
expansion of lending activities tends to increase risk (Keeton 1999). More 
elaborate modelling, which distinguishes between the likelihood of failure and time 
to failure, finds that basic indicators of a bank￿s condition such as capital, net 
income and impaired assets are also important determinants of the timing of bank 
failure (Cole and Gunther 1995). 
A number of studies compare the effects of individual-bank risk-taking and 
macroeconomic conditions on the likelihood of bank failure. Emmons (1993), 
when considering US banking failures, concludes that increased risk-taking at 
individual banks alone does not fully account for the observed pattern of bank 
failures. Local economic conditions are also important predictors of bank failure. It 
is the coincidence of risky bank portfolios and difficult economic conditions that 
makes bank failure most likely.  
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, Pazarbaşioğlu and Billings (1997), in their study of the 1994 
Mexican financial crisis, refine the distinction between the effect of bank-specific 
and economy-wide factors on the likelihood of bank failure. They find that factors 
determining the likelihood of failure differ from those determining the timing of 
failure. Bank-specific variables, in combination with aggregate banking sector 
factors help to explain the likelihood of bank failure, while macroeconomic factors 
play a pivotal role in influencing the time of failure. In Mexico, high real interest 
rates, exchange rate depreciation and an increase in the overall gearing of the 
economy triggered bank failures.  4 
 
 
2.2 System-wide  Variation 
While each bank, on its own, can choose to take on more or less risk by changing 
its own behaviour, its riskiness and performance will also be influenced by 
developments in the aggregate supply and demand for loan finance. On the demand 
side, banks may become more risky because either borrowers put more risky 
projects forward for bank finance or the amplitude of the economic cycle may, 
unexpectedly, increase. On the supply side, the behaviour of individual banks may 
become more risky due to industry-wide developments, such as changes in 
regulation and the level of competition in the banking market.  
One widely used measure of credit risk is the ratio of impaired assets to total   
on-balance sheet assets.1 Figures 1 and 2 compare the movement in the   
industry-average impaired assets ratio during the 1990s with movements in a 
number of macroeconomic variables that influence loan supply and demand.2 
Following the unravelling of the credit boom of the late 1980s the overall level of 
Australian banks￿ impaired assets increased sharply in 1990 and 1991, reaching a 
peak in 1992. As banks wrote down the value of their bad loans the impaired assets 
ratio declined sharply. Subsequently, as the underlying condition of borrowers 
recovered, the ratio fell more gradually up until late 1997. Over the last few   
years, the industry-average impaired assets ratio has remained roughly constant at 
0.7 per cent. 
                                           
1   Following the definition specified by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 
impaired assets are taken to be the sum of non-accrual items, restructured items and   
assets acquired through security enforcement (for more details see Reserve Bank of   
Australia (1995)). The Reserve Bank revised asset quality measurement and reporting 
arrangements in September 1994. Prior to that, impaired assets were taken to be the sum of 
non-accrual items and accrual items in arrears 90 days and longer. Tests for a structural break 
in the data associated with the change in reporting arrangements find that the break is not 
statistically significant. 
2   Definitions of these macroeconomic variables are presented in Appendix A. 5 
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2.2.1  The demand for loan finance 
Many studies show that bank performance is correlated with the business cycle 
(Lowe and Rohling 1993; Kaufman 1998). Firms￿ ability to service debt is most 
directly determined by their income, their gearing and the level of interest rates. In 
the first instance, the ability of firms to meet their debt obligations depends upon 
the share of their income taken up by interest payments. In Australia, the share of 
interest payments in corporate income and household income fell steadily over the 
first few years of the 1990s. In the latter half of the decade growth in corporate 
debt has been offset by lower interest rates, leaving the share of interest in income 
roughly unchanged. In contrast, the gearing of the household sector has grown 
more strongly since 1994. The peaks in the share of interest payments in household 
income coincided with peaks in interest rates in 1989 and late 1994. 7 
 
 
All else equal, growth in aggregate income and output will strengthen firms￿ ability 
to meet their debt obligations. Calomiris, Orphanides and Sharpe (1997) outline 
three factors that exacerbate non-financial firms￿ sensitivity to cycles in aggregate 
activity: information asymmetries between borrowers and financiers; the 
advantages of investing during periods of rapid growth; and firms￿ tendency 
towards excessive optimism. These factors suggest that non-financial firms￿ 
performance (and banks￿ credit risk, in turn) will depend upon both the level and 
the rate of growth of aggregate activity.  
Firstly, firms that rely on debt to expand their operations aggressively during 
periods of rapid economic growth are likely to be the least creditworthy when 
recession strikes. In the presence of information asymmetries between the 
managers and financiers of firms, debt contracts can go some way towards aligning 
managers￿ incentives with financiers￿ interests. This has the potential to reduce 
moral-hazard driven behaviour by firm management, adverse selection and 
monitoring costs. The firms that rely on debt (rather than equity) finance, therefore, 
are likely to be those for which asymmetric information problems are the most 
pronounced. These firms are likely to be most susceptible to slowdowns in 
economic growth. 
Secondly, theoretical models of optimal investment strategies suggest that there  
are advantages in expanding rapidly. For example, Murphy, Shleifer and   
Vishny (1989) posit that growth in one sector of the economy has spillover effects 
by increasing demand for other sectors￿ output. Such considerations emphasise the 
advantages of investing during periods of rapid economic growth. 
Thirdly, Calomiris et al (1997) argue that firms may not properly anticipate how 
aggregate economic circumstances may affect the value and liquidity of their 
assets. As a result, firms may have a tendency to be excessively optimistic 
regarding their ability to avoid financial distress and therefore, take on excessive 
leverage during periods of economic expansion. This view is in line with   
Minsky (1995) who characterises economic cycles as being driven by euphoric  
over-expansion of credit. Over a run of good times (characterised by minor cycles 
in economic activity) firms￿ and households￿ balance sheets change so that   
ever-larger proportions of their gross cash flows are committed to debt service. 
That is, preferences for leverage follow a cyclical pattern. 8 
 
 
These three arguments suggest that, in the short term, stronger output growth will 
reduce banks￿ impaired assets, although over longer horizons this relationship may 
work in the opposite direction, with an acceleration in output growth leading to 
higher impaired assets. The sharp contraction in economic output in 1990￿1991 
coincided with the rise in impaired assets, whilst the sustained real growth of 
around 4 per cent since 1992 has been associated with the steady decline in 
impaired assets. 
In Australia, there is a long history of slumps in building activity leading to 
banking problems (Kent and Lowe 1997). As the share of activity taken up by 
construction grows, therefore, the economy￿s overall credit quality is likely to 
decline. Particularly during the early 1990s a large proportion of banks￿ problem 
loans were associated with the financing of commercial property. The sharp peak 
in the share of construction in GDP in early 1990 led the peak in impaired assets. 
The spike in construction activity in 1998 was not, however, reflected in an 
increase in impaired assets. This reflected, in part, the fall in the share of 
commercial property finance provided by banks as listed property trusts took on a 
greater role. 
Diamond (1991) suggests that real interest rates influence companies￿ choice 
between risky and safe projects. Low real interest rates increase the present value 
of firms￿ future profits. Since choosing more risky projects would put that future 
return at risk, as the expected future value of the company rises, the incentive to 
adopt low-risk projects increases. Thus, lower real interest rates are predicted to 
reduce the likelihood of default. This, in turn, reduces the riskiness of banks￿ loan 
portfolios. While the peak in the real interest rate preceded the rise in impaired 
assets in 1991 by more than a year, the increase in the real interest rate in 1994 was 
not associated with a commensurate rise in impaired assets. 
Several recent studies (which are surveyed in Laker (1999)) have sought to identify 
those macroeconomic variables that best predict system-wide banking crises. 
Consistent with the arguments discussed above, the variables most often found to 
be associated with a high probability of banking crisis are low output growth, high 
real interest rates and strong credit growth.  9 
 
 
2.2.2  The supply of loan finance 
Supply-side developments also influence banks￿ riskiness and performance. Chief 
among these factors are agency costs, the regulatory environment, the 
competitiveness of the banking market and incentives for herding behaviour 
amongst banks. 
The credit risk on any individual loan can be broken down into two components: 
the probability that the borrower will default, and the losses incurred in the event 
of default. The principal determinant of the losses incurred in the event of default 
is the value of security held as collateral against bank debt. Asset price deflation, 
by eroding the collateral against which banks lend, heightens financial institutions￿ 
vulnerability to borrowers￿ defaults. Reduced collateral values increase adverse 
selection problems as banks try to distinguish between sound and unsound 
borrowers. Increases in asset prices, by increasing the perceived collateral of 
potential borrowers, make financial institutions willing to supply a greater volume 
of funds at any given interest rate (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). In Australia, the 
collateral for most loans is real estate. The collapse in commercial property prices 
in 1990￿1991 was associated with the sharp increase in impaired assets. The 
subsequent recovery in commercial property prices has coincided with the steady 
improvement in the banks￿ impaired assets position. 
Regulatory constraints, both prudential controls and those aimed at influencing 
macroeconomic activity, may directly constrain banks￿ risk-taking. Financial 
deregulation in Australia during the 1980s saw banks expand into areas that they 
previously would not have entered. There was both a rapid expansion of credit and 
a lowering of credit standards applied by banks (Macfarlane 1991). The Australian 
experience mirrored that of other countries that undertook similar programs of 
deregulation, most notably the Scandinavian countries, but also the US and UK. 
During the 1990s, however, the changes in the Australian banking industry￿s 
operating environment were less marked. 
Changes in the level of competition within the banking market (particularly when 
driven by deregulation) may also generate system-wide movements in riskiness 
and performance. For instance, a more competitive environment may prompt 
individual institutions to seek to capture greater market share. While such 10 
 
 
expansion may be viable for one institution acting in isolation, when all   
banks behave in the same way such expansion sees increased lending to more 
marginal, risky borrowers (Drake and Llewellyn 1997). More generally, increased 
competition may also erode super-normal profits thus making banks￿ profits more 
sensitive to the underlying riskiness of their loan portfolios. 
There are a number of models that suggest that it may be optimal for banks to 
adopt herding-type behaviour. Rajan (1994) provides one such model that links 
herding behaviour with cycles in credit growth and credit quality. This model is 
based on two stylised facts. Firstly, the market is seen to regard an individual 
bank￿s poor performance more leniently when the entire banking sector has been 
hit by an adverse shock. Thus there is an incentive for each to adjust its credit 
policy in line with other banks in the market. Secondly, a liberal credit policy, on 
the part of an individual bank, will boost current earnings at the expense of future 
earnings. Poor quality borrowers will meet their repayment obligations for at least 
a short time before becoming unable to service their loan obligations. Since in the 
short term expanding lending boosts earnings, the banks have an incentive to ease 
their credit standards in times of rapid credit growth (and likewise, to tighten 
standards when credit growth is slowing). 
In the short term, increased credit growth, by adding to banks￿ total assets without 
immediately increasing impaired assets, would be expected to reduce the impaired 
assets ratio. Over the longer term, however, it would be expected that rapid credit 
growth, by increasing lending to more marginal borrowers, would lead to increases 
in the impaired assets ratio. The rapid credit growth of the late 1980s preceded the 
Australian banks￿ loan loss problems of 1990￿1992. Since then, however, strong 




3.   Australian Banks￿ Impaired Assets During the 1990s 
3.1  A Simple Comparison of Firm-specific and System-wide Variation 
Figure 3 shows the mean, median and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 
distribution of impaired assets ratios across all banks each quarter.3 The   
unweighted mean is more variable than the asset-weighted mean. This reflects the 
fact that the impaired assets ratios of smaller banks tend to be more variable than 
the larger banks. The foreign-owned banks with small asset bases within Australia 
experienced particularly high levels of impaired assets between 1990 and 1992.  































The movement of the 25th and 75th percentiles show that between 1990 and 1992 
the dispersion across banks rose considerably. The spread between the 25th and  
75th percentiles almost doubled between June 1990 and March 1992, rising from  
3.1 percentage points to 5.9 percentage points. Over this period the weakest banks 
became comparatively weaker. Exits from the industry and the overall 
                                           
3  The sample includes both Australian-owned banks and locally incorporated subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. Foreign bank branches, however, are excluded. 12 
 
 
improvement in banks￿ credit risk exposure have seen the interquartile range 
narrow to 0.7 percentage points by September 1999. With this narrowing of the 
distribution, the differences between smaller and larger banks has also narrowed; 
there being almost no difference between the asset-weighted and unweighted 
means since 1993. 
The distinction between variation across banks and variation through time can be 
made more precise by decomposing the variance of the full panel of data. The data 
are quarterly for the period June 1990 to September 1999. The panel is unbalanced. 
Of the 35 banks included in the sample, 16 reported impaired assets data 
continuously throughout the full sample period. The remainder includes banks that 
entered the Australian banking market, were taken over, or converted to foreign 
bank branch status during the decade. A full list of the banks included and the 
period over which they reported impaired assets data are presented in Appendix A. 
Standard analysis of variance techniques break down the total panel variation   
into variation due to differences between banks, variation through time and a 
residual variance using the calculations shown in Table 1 (Croxton, Cowden and 
Klein 1967).  
Table 1: Analysis of Variance 
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Where:  i x  is the mean of all observations for bank i 
  i N  is the number of observations for bank i 
  t x  is the mean across banks at time t 
  t N  is the number of banks in the sample at time t 





Table 2 shows the proportion of the total panel variation accounted for by the 
variation between the impaired assets ratio￿s mean level across banks and the 
ratio￿s mean level across time. The decomposition is presented on two bases: the 
first is a simple unweighted basis; the second weights the impaired assets ratios by 
each bank￿s share in total bank assets. In both cases most of the variation in the 
panel is due to differences between banks, although the variation through time also 
accounts for a substantial share of the total panel variation. When the asset-share 
weights are applied, the variability across banks declines (both in absolute terms 
and as a share of the total panel variation), indicating that small banks tend to be 
more widely dispersed around the industry average. The variation across time is 
also lower when weighted by each bank￿s asset share than on an unweighted basis, 
reflecting the fact that smaller banks￿ impaired assets ratios tend to be more 
variable through time. 
Table 2: Decomposition of Variance 
Share of total variance, per cent  
Panel sample: June 1990￿September 1999 
 Banks  Time  Residual 
Unweighted 69.4  18.8  11.8 
Asset-weighted 59.1  8.1 32.8 
 
3.2 Regression  Analysis 
To more precisely measure the extent to which the macroeconomy influences 
variation through time in banks￿ impaired assets ratios, we conduct panel 
regression analysis. The results for four models are summarised in Table 3. In each 
case, a fixed-effects model including first-order auto regression is estimated taking 
each bank￿s impaired assets ratio as the dependent variable.4  
Since Australia has seen few banking failures, it is not possible to replicate   
the empirical studies of firm-specific determinants of bank failure surveyed in   
 
                                           
4   Pre-testing of the data suggests that the impaired assets ratio is stationary (around a trend). At 
any rate, given the relatively small number of time series observations (38 quarters), our 




Table 3: Impaired Assets and the Macroeconomy 
Dependent variable: impaired assets/total assets 
Panel sample (quarterly data): June 1990￿September 1999 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Independent variable  Coefficient 





























Real credit growtht-3 0.287*** 
(0.062) 
Real credit growtht-3 0.204*** 
(0.071) 
    Real GDP growtht ￿0.107* 
(0.083) 
    Real interest ratet-4 0.054** 
(0.031) 






































Real credit growtht-3 0.132** 
(0.078) 














Share of construction 
(excluding property trust 
purchases) in GDPt-4 
0.278*** 
(0.099) 









Notes:   The models are estimated using ordinary least squares including bank-specific fixed effects. Figures in 
parentheses show the standard error of the coefficient estimate. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 




Section 2.1. In focusing on the effect of the macroeconomic cycle on banks, effects 
are captured by the bank-specific fixed effects, which capture differences between 
the average level of each bank￿s impaired assets.  
Application of the Hausman specification test rejected the random-effects model in 
favour of the fixed-effects model at a one per cent significance level. A fixed 
effects model is a natural choice since our estimation sample is identical to the 
population of interest (Judge et al 1988). Our sample includes all banks 
incorporated in Australia rather than a random sample from the population of 
Australian financial institutions.5  
The fixed-effects model assumes that interbank differences are constant through 
time and each bank￿s impaired assets ratio will respond in the same way to 
movements in macroeconomic variables. Figure 1 shows these assumptions are 
unlikely to hold in practice, suggesting estimated coefficients are likely to 
understate the response of smaller institutions and overstate the response of larger 
institutions. The simple, fixed-effects approach is, however, given empirical 
support by the absence of significant heteroscedasticity in the residuals from our 
estimated models.6 
A lagged dependent term and trend are included in each model. The impaired 
assets ratio exhibits quite strong autocorrelation. Thus, shocks to the level of 
impaired assets are seen to be quite persistent. This is borne out in the impulse 
response functions shown in Figure 4, which show the response of impaired assets, 
predicted by each model, to a one-standard deviation shock in each independent 
variable. The trend term is also highly significant.  
                                           
5   The sample excludes those banks that reported for less than six consecutive quarters. 
6   The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity accepts (at a one per cent significance level) the 
hypothesis that the variance of each model￿s residuals is equal across banks. Since most of the 
independent variables vary through time, but are constant across banks, the estimated models 
may be prone to heteroscedasticity where the residual variance differs across time periods. 
The Breusch-Pagan test also accepted the hypothesis that the variance of each model￿s 
residuals did not exhibit such clustering. 16 
 
 
Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions 
Response of impaired assets to a one-standard deviation shock (for one quarter)  
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The first model presented in Table 3 highlights the relationship between the 
corporate and household sectors￿ interest burden and banks￿ credit risk. There is a 
well-determined positive relation between banks￿ impaired assets and both the 
corporate and household interest burden. Each percentage point increase in   
the share of interest in household disposable income is predicted to yield a   
0.20 percentage point increase in impaired assets, while the same increase in the 
share of interest payments in corporate income would increase impaired assets by 
just 0.07 percentage points. Over the past decade, corporate gearing has been more 
than four times more variable than household gearing. As a result, a one-standard 
deviation rise in corporate gearing is estimated to increase the impaired assets ratio 
by 0.55 percentage points, while a one-standard deviation rise in household gearing 
would raise the impaired assets ratio by 0.35 percentage points.  17 
 
 
Thus, while banks￿ impaired assets are more sensitive to movements in household 
gearing, the probability of household gearing having as large an impact on banks￿ 
impaired assets as corporate gearing is small. Nevertheless, the findings that banks￿ 
impaired assets are more sensitive to household gearing than corporate gearing is 
surprising. Although the share of housing and personal loans in total bank lending 
increased over the decade (from 33 per cent to 41 per cent) it remains the case that 
most bank lending is provided to businesses. Moreover, home loans (which 
averaged around 80 per cent of non-business lending) have been particularly low 
risk; since 1994, home loans in arrears by 90 days or more have averaged just  
0.4 per cent of banks￿ total home loans. The strong relationship between banks￿ 
impaired assets ratio and household gearing may reflect the broader 
macroeconomic impacts of changes in household gearing due to its effect on 
household expenditure or may simply reflect limitations of the data. 
Impaired assets are also found to be strongly and positively related to the rate of 
real credit growth. This is consistent with rapid loan growth leading to increased 
lending to more marginal borrowers, which could be due to either reduced credit 
standards resulting from a shift in the supply of debt finance or the demand-side 
effects outlined by Calomiris et al (1997). This relationship takes effect with a 
quite short lag (just three quarters). This would seem to conflict with the analysis 
of Rajan (1994) and Calomiris et al which suggests that in the short run a negative 
relation is to be expected and only over the longer run would rapid credit growth 
generate increases in the impaired assets ratio. Our result is strongly influenced by 
the large movements in credit growth in 1990 and impaired assets during the early 
years of the 1990s that saw the realisation of credit quality problems, which had 
built up over the previous decade. 
The second model adds real GDP growth and real interest rates to the first model. 
Acceleration in GDP growth is associated with a contemporaneous fall in the 
impaired assets ratio, although the estimated relationship is not particularly well 
determined. This result is consistent with the short-term relationship suggested   
by Calomiris et al and with the results of the cross-country studies discussed in 
Laker (1999). 18 
The real interest rate has a reasonably strong effect on the impaired assets ratio 
over and above its effect on the corporate and household sectors￿ interest burden. 
Each percentage point increase in real interest rates is estimated to increase the 
impaired assets ratio by 0.05 percentage points. This is consistent with the effect of 
real interest rates on firms￿ risk-taking posited by Diamond (1991). 
The third model brings together the economy￿s interest burden, real credit growth 
and influences coming from the property and construction sector. Commercial 
property prices and the share of construction in GDP both exert a strong influence 
over banks￿ credit risk. Consistent with the importance of commercial property as 
collateral against secured loans, a one-percentage point slowdown in commercial 
property price inflation is estimated to increase the impaired assets ratio by   
0.06 percentage points.7  
The share of construction in aggregate activity exerts a strong influence over the 
impaired assets ratio. Each percentage point increase in the share of construction in 
aggregate activity is estimated to lead to an increase in the impaired assets ratio of 
almost 0.4 percentage points. Moreover, construction activity dominates the 
variables included in model 2 that are not included in model 3 ￿ real GDP growth 
and the real interest rate. As is the case for the relation between real credit growth 
and impaired assets, the effect of increases in construction flows through quickly. 
Again, this largely reflects the crystallisation of loan losses following from the  
run-up in construction activity in the late 1980s. 
Of most relevance to banks is construction activity financed by bank loans. While 
banks are the main source of funds for construction, over the second half of 1990s 
the value of property assets held by public unit trusts grew rapidly (growing at an 
average rate of 23 per cent per annum between 1994 and 1999). Data on banks￿ 
lending for construction are only available for the second half of the 1990s. To take 
account of the growth in listed property trusts a fourth model is estimated which 
includes construction less gross purchases of property by listed property trusts as a 
share of GDP. This measure is subject to two main shortcomings. Firstly, it is not 
possible to distinguish between property trusts￿ purchases of newly completed 
                                           
7  Following Kent and Lowe (1997), who find evidence that collateral effects work through 
nominal rather than real property price inflation, nominal property price inflation is included 
in this model. 19 
 
 
construction and established buildings. As a result there is some mismatch between 
construction activity and property trusts￿ purchases. Secondly, the measure still 
includes construction activity financed from other non-bank sources. 
It remains the case that impaired assets are strongly and positively related to the 
share of construction in activity after adjusting for property trust purchases. 
However, the sensitivity of impaired assets to construction is somewhat reduced, 
falling from 0.4 percentage points to 0.3 percentage points. Since construction 
including that financed outside the banking system has a larger impact on impaired 
assets than the narrower measure, this suggests that the broader macroeconomic 
effects of a build-up in construction activity have an important effect on banks￿ 
credit risk over and above the direct effect that comes from developments in the 
credit quality of the construction projects financed by banks. 
The effect of movements in the exchange rate, the terms of trade and share prices 
on banks￿ impaired assets was also investigated. Unlike the results found in several 
cross-country studies, these variables exhibited no well-determined relationship 
with Australian banks￿ impaired assets. Australia did not, during the 1990s, 
experience exchange rate shocks anywhere near as large as countries such as 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Norway and Sweden. Nor did Australia experience 
severe falls in equity prices. 
Comparing the four models it can be seen that most of the through-time variation 
in impaired assets is due to developments in corporate gearing and real credit 
growth. Although the addition of the property-sector variables reduces the size of 
the estimated effect of gearing and credit growth on impaired assets, overall these 
relations are reasonably robust to changes in model specification. While the share 
of construction in GDP and the real interest rate are also strongly correlated with 
the impaired assets ratio, the inclusion of these variables does not greatly improve 
the model￿s explanatory power. 20 
4.  The Profitability of Australian Banks 1960￿1999 
A weakness in the preceding analysis is that data are available for less than one full 
cycle in banks￿ credit quality. To analyse the effect of macroeconomic variation on 
banks over the longer term, profitability data, specifically, the after-tax return on 
assets earned by banks is considered.  
Whilst banks￿ return on assets is influenced by their credit risk, the relationship 
between the two is not straightforward. Movements in the return on assets will 
reflect not just credit risk, but the full range of risks, including banks￿ exposures to 
movements in interest rates and exchange rates, liquidity risk and operational risks. 
Moreover, banks￿ return on assets reflects not just risk-taking, but also other 
factors such as the mix of on- and off-balance sheet business, operating efficiency, 
the level of competition within the banking market and regulatory constraints. The 
relationship between risk and return also depends upon whether banks price for 
risk, and the lags between taking on risk and the crystallisation of risk into realised 
losses. To the extent that banks earn higher returns by taking on riskier business, 
this will boost the return on assets. However, if a bank experiences losses beyond 
what it had provisioned for, such losses will reduce profitability. Over the 1990s, 
the return on assets and the impaired assets ratio exhibited strong negative 
contemporaneous correlation. 
4.1  A Simple Comparison of Firm-specific and System-wide Variation 
Figure 5 shows movements in the average level and distribution of asset returns 
since 1960.8 It can be seen that the credit problems of the early 1990s resulted in 
the largest losses in forty years. Up until the mid 1970s, there was little movement 
in banks￿ asset returns and the distribution of returns was quite narrow. Smaller 
banks were, however, more profitable than the larger institutions (the unweighted 
mean being around 0.3 percentage points higher than the asset-weighed mean   
until 1975).  
                                           
8  Profit figures are adjusted to exclude government assistance provided to the State Bank of 
Victoria in 1990 and State Bank of South Australia in 1991. 21 
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From the second half of the 1970s, financial liberalisation allowed banks to 
increase their return on assets. The dispersion across banks also widened 
considerably. Between 1960 and 1975 the interquartile range averaged   
0.3 percentage points; since then it has averaged 0.6 percentage points.9 The 
difference in returns across banks, however, became less influenced by bank size. 
On average since 1980 there has been little difference between the unweighted and 
asset-weighted means. 
Decomposing the panel variance using analysis of variance techniques outlined in 
Section 3.1 indicates that while interbank variation in profitability exceeds 
through-time variation, most of the variation lies in the residual (Table 4). In 
contrast to the impaired assets data discussed above, when the asset-share weights 
are applied the share of interbank variation in total panel variation increases 
substantially. Although several of the smaller banks made losses in 1990, which 
caused the fall in the unweighted mean, in terms of the overall variability of the 
panel, this is outweighed by the large losses made by large banks in 1990, 1991 
                                           
9   Excluding the four years 1989￿1992, the interquartile range has averaged 0.5 percentage 
points since 1976. 22 
 
 
and 1992.10 The share of variability through time also falls when the asset weights 
are applied, indicating that the smaller banks￿ profitability tends to be more 
variable than the larger banks￿.  
Table 4: Decomposition of Variance 
Share of total variance, per cent 
Panel sample: 1960￿1999 
 Banks  Time  Residual 
Unweighted 22.9  13.4  63.7 
Asset-weighted 66.7  8.7 24.6 
 
4.2  Banks￿ Return on Assets and the Macroeconomy 
Demirg￿c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), in their cross-country comparison of bank 
profitability, find that higher real interest rates and, to a lesser extent, higher 
growth in real per capita GDP are associated with stronger bank profitability. 
While their finding of a positive relationship between per capita output and bank 
profitability is consistent with other studies that focus on banking risk, the positive 
relation between profitability and real interest rates runs counter to the findings of 
the risk-based studies. The results can be rationalised, however, by the fact that in 
periods of high interest rates banks are often able to earn higher interest rate 
spreads as well as running higher risks (Reserve Bank of Australia 1999). 
Figures 6 and 7 present the weighted-average return on assets and macroeconomic 
indicators of financial system stability. The longer run of data highlights the 
increase in the share of interest payments in corporate income during the 1980s, 
which was a product of a substantial increase in the corporate sector￿s gearing, and 
(in the second half of the 1980s) high real interest rates.11  
                                           
10   When the State Bank of Victoria failed in 1990, and when the State Bank of South Australia 
failed in 1992, each was the 5th largest in the industry at the time. In 1992, Westpac, then the 
largest bank, and ANZ, ranked third, both reported large losses. 
11  Since a robust measure of commercial property price inflation over the 1960s is not available, 
residential property price inflation is considered in its place (during the 1990s the two price 
measures broadly moved together). In addition, data on the share of interest payments in the 
household sector￿s income are not available prior to 1973 so the household sector is not 
included in the analysis that follows.  23 
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The slowdown in real GDP growth in 1990 coincided with the banks￿ losses in that 
year. The recession of 1983, however, was accompanied by only a slight reduction 
in banks￿ profits. Similarly, while the share of construction in GDP reached 
historically high levels in 1989￿1990, peaks around the same level in 1971 and 
1982 occurred in periods when bank profits were stable or rising.  
The dramatic peaks in residential property price inflation in 1974 and 1989 
preceded periods of contraction in real credit. It was only the later episode, 
however, that had any marked impact on bank profitability. The muted response in 
1974 reflects the impact of the close regulation of banks during the 1970s.  24 
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To more closely quantify the effect of macroeconomic variation on banking 
profitability, the panel regression analysis presented in Section 3.3 is repeated 
taking the return on assets as the dependent variable (Table 5).12 
                                           
12   As in the analysis of impaired assets presented in Table 3, the choice of fixed effects is 
supported by the apparent absence of heteroscedasticity across banks. The Breusch-Pagan test 
accepts (at the one per cent significance level) the hypothesis that the variance of each 
model￿s residuals does not differ across banks. Unlike the previous models, however, the  
Breusch-Pagan test accepts the hypothesis that the variance of each model￿s residuals differs 
across time periods. The return-on-assets models, therefore, are estimated using estimated 




Table 5: Return on Assets and the Macroeconomy 
Dependent variable: operating profit after tax/total assets 
Panel sample (annual data): 1960￿1999 
Independent variable  Coefficient  Independent variable Coefficient  Independent variable  Coefficient 







Return on assetst-1 0.113*** 
(0.041) 
Return on assetst-1 0.109*** 
(0.041) 
Return on assetst-1 0.093*** 
(0.040) 












Real credit growtht-1 ￿0.025*** 
(0.007) 
Real credit growtht-1 ￿0.020*** 
(0.008) 
Real credit growtht-1 ￿0.012** 
(0.007) 
    Real interest ratet-1 ￿0.015* 
(0.010) 





















Notes:   The models are estimated using estimated generalised least squares to adjust for heteroscedasticity in the form of variation in the residuals across 
time. The models include bank-specific fixed effects. Figures in parentheses show the standard error of the coefficient estimate. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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Like the impaired assets data, the annual profitability data provide an unbalanced 
panel. Of the 21 banks included in the panel regression, only 6 were in operation 
throughout the whole period. The banks included in the panel (and the years for 
which annual reports were available) are listed in Appendix A. 
Again, a trend term is included. In each model the trend effect is small but 
significantly positive. Here the trend is taken to proxy the impact of deregulation. 
A trend term, rather than a distinct structural break, is included as the process of 
deregulation was a gradual one. Restrictions on bank interest rates and lending 
policies were progressively eased between 1973 and 1986, allowing banks to 
expand into new, more profitable, areas of business, and allowing banks greater 
control over their interest margins (Battellino and McMillan 1989).  
Consistent with the negative correlation between impaired assets and profits during 
the 1990s, the coefficients on all variables have the opposite sign to that found in 
the models of impaired assets. This would suggest that banks have not fully priced 
for risk by increasing margins as risk increases. Rather than increased risk resulting 
in higher bank profits, higher risk has reduced bank profitability. 
Consistent with the results from the first model of impaired assets shown in   
Section 3.2, the share of interest in corporate income and real credit growth display 
a strong relationship with bank profitability. Each percentage point increase in the 
share of interest in corporate income is estimated to reduce the return on assets by 
around 0.01 percentage points.  
Similarly, the return on assets is predicted to fall by 0.03 percentage points for 
each percentage-point acceleration in real credit growth. Accelerated real credit 
growth is found to reduce bank profits with a lag of one year. Rajan (1994) and 
Calomiris et al (1997) predict that such a response should reflect a long-run, rather 
than short-run, effect of rapid credit growth on banks￿ risk. That the observed 
response is relatively quick largely reflects the rapid acceleration in credit growth 
during the late 1980s preceding the loan loss problems of 1990￿1992. The impulse 
response functions shown in Figure 8 demonstrate that the strong relation between 
real credit growth and bank profits combined with the high variability of real credit 
growth (particularly during the mid 1970s) has seen real credit growth have a large 
effect on banks￿ return on assets. 27 
 
Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions 
Response of the return on assets to a one-standard deviation shock (for one year)  
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The second model shows that real interest rates exert some influence beyond their 
effects on corporate gearing. In line with Diamond￿s prediction that higher real 
interest rates increase the likelihood of borrower defaults, increases in real interest 
rates reduce bank profitability: each percentage point increase in real interest rates 
lowers profitability by around 0.02 percentage points (this relationship, however, is 
not strongly significant). The negative relation found between bank profits and real 
interest rates runs counter to Demirg￿c-Kunt and Huizinga￿s findings, suggesting 28 
 
that in Australia￿s case the effect of high real interest rates in impairing banks￿ 
credit quality has outweighed banks￿ capacity to earn higher margins. In contrast to 
the results presented in Section 3.2, real GDP growth did not exert a significant 
influence on banks￿ profitability beyond its effect on the share of interest in 
corporate income. 
The third model shown in Table 5 combines gearing and credit growth measures 
with property price inflation. The importance of property as collateral underlying 
secured bank lending is borne out by the positive relation between residential 
property price inflation and bank profitability: a one percentage point increase in 
property price inflation is found to lead to an increase in banks￿ return on assets of 
0.03 percentage points. This effect, however, is seen to take several years. 
Although the share of construction in GDP was found to have a strong effect on 
impaired assets during the 1990s, over the longer period it did not have a 
significant influence over the return on assets. 
While all three models leave most of the variation in the return on assets 
unexplained, extending the first model does not greatly improve explanatory 
power. In addition, extending the first model does not greatly change the estimated 
coefficients on corporate gearing and credit growth. 
5. Conclusion 
The relative importance of system-wide and firm-specific factors influences the 
stability of the overall financial system and the way in which shocks are 
transmitted through the financial system and the broader economy. The relative 
weight of these two sources of variation also bears on policy prescriptions aimed at 
strengthening financial system stability. While micro-level risks are reduced by 
individual-institution prudential supervision (including controls such as capital 
adequacy requirements and limits on lending concentrations), system-wide risk is 
minimised by maintaining sound macroeconomic policy. 
The size of, and variation in, individual-institution differences highlights the 
contribution that individual-institution prudential supervision can make to financial 
system stability. It is neither possible, nor desirable, to require that all institutions 29 
 
conform to the same risk profile. However, to the extent that supervision reins in 
risk-taking by those institutions lying at the high-risk extreme of the spectrum, this 
is likely to strengthen the financial system as a whole. The effect of economic 
variables on banks￿ performance also suggests that prudential policies that 
strengthen incentives for banks to act in a counter-cyclical way (for example, by 
encouraging banks to increase their capital ratios as economy-wide gearing rises) 
can effectively reduce the risk of system-wide instability. 
The strength of the relation between the macroeconomic variables considered and 
banks￿ risk indicates that macroeconomic policy has an important role to play in 
providing a stable environment for banks to operate in. The extent to which 
monetary policy, in particular, should be set with an eye towards financial system 
stability, rather than focusing solely on price stability, remains controversial. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that sound monetary policy is an important   
pre-condition for financial system stability. 
The simple models presented in this paper provide a first pass at assessing how 
macroeconomic conditions may affect financial system risk. The relatively small 
datasets available (both in terms of the number of banks and the length of time) 
constrain the scope of empirical analysis. Our simplistic analysis, which assumes 
that each bank responds to macroeconomic developments in the same way, fails to 
address the interaction between macroeconomic and individual-firm effects, and 
therefore is likely to understate the effect of the macroeconomy on banks￿ credit 
risk and profitability. Since both the level and dispersion of impaired assets and 
banking profitability move with the economic cycle, some portion of the observed 
interbank variation may also be due to macroeconomic effects. The inclusion of 
bank-specific variables (such as bank size, loan concentration, asset composition 
and the speed of lending growth) into the modelling framework would allow a 
more complete investigation of the relative contribution of individual-bank 
characteristics and movement in macroeconomic variables on overall bank risk and 
performance. 30 
 
Appendix A: Data 
Banking Data 
Quarterly panel 
Bank Sample  period 
Adelaide Bank   March 1994￿September 1999 
Advance Bank Australia   June 1990￿December 1996 
Arab Bank Australia   September 1994￿September 1999 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group  June 1990￿September 1999 
Bankers Trust Australia  June 1990￿September 1999 
Bank of America Australia  June 1990￿September 1995 
Bank of China  June 1990￿September 1999 
Bank of Melbourne  June 1990￿September 1997 
Bank of New Zealand  June 1990￿December 1992 
Bank of Queensland  September 1990￿September 1999 
Bank of Singapore (Australia)  June 1990￿June 1996 
Bank of South Australia  June 1990￿June 1995 
Bank of Tokyo ￿ Mitsubishi (Australia)   June 1990￿September 1999 
Bank of Western Australia (BankWest)  June 1990￿September 1999 
Banque Nationale de Paris  June 1990￿December 1996 
Barclays Bank PLC  March 1994￿December 1996 
Bendigo Bank   September 1995￿September 1999 
Challenge   June 1990￿September 1995 
Citibank  June 1990￿September 1999 
Colonial State Bank  June 1990￿September 1999 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia  June 1990￿September 1999 
Deutsche Bank AG  June 1990￿December 1996 
HSBC Bank Australia   June 1990￿September 1999 
IBJ Australia Bank   June 1990￿September 1999 
ING Bank (Australia)   December 1994￿September 1999 
Lloyds Bank NZA Ltd  June 1990￿December 1996 
Macquarie Bank  June 1990￿September 1999 
Mitsubishi Bank of Australia  June 1990￿March 1996 
National Australia Bank   June 1990￿September 1999 





Standard Chartered Bank Australia   June 1990￿September 1999 
St. George Bank  September 1992￿September 1999 
Suncorp-Metway   June 1990￿September 1999 
Trust Bank  June 1990￿September 1999 
Westpac Banking Corporation  June 1990￿September 1999 
Source:  Data reported to the Reserve Bank (up until July 1998) and APRA (thereafter). 
 
Annual panel 
Bank Sample  period  
Advance Bank Australia   1986￿1996  Acquired by St. George Bank 




Australian Bank   1982￿1988  Acquired by State Bank of Victoria 
Australian Resources Development 
Bank
(a) 
1968￿1989  Acquired by National Australia Bank 
Bankers Trust Australia
(a)  1987￿1998  Acquired by Deutsche Bank 
Bank of America Australia
(a)  1960￿1977  Acquired by ANZ 
Bank of America Australia  1986￿1994   
Bank of Melbourne  1990￿1997  Acquired by Westpac 
Bank of Queensland
(a)  1960￿1999  Prior to 1970 operated as Brisbane 
Permanent Building and Banking Company
Bank of Singapore (Australia)  1987￿1995   
Bank of Tokyo ￿ Mitsubishi 
(Australia)  
1986￿1998  Prior to 1995 operated as the Bank of 
Tokyo 
Bank of Western Australia
(a)  1960￿1999  Prior to 1994 operated as the Rural and 
Industries Bank of Western Australia 
Challenge   1987￿1994  Acquired by Westpac 
Citibank
(a) 1986￿1998   
Colonial State Bank
(a)  1960￿1998  Prior to 1996 operated as the  
State Bank of New South Wales 
Commercial Bank of Australia
(a)  1960￿1981  Merged with Bank of New South Wales 
Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney
(a) 
1960￿1981  Merged with National Australia Bank 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
(a) 1960￿1999   
HSBC Bank Australia
(a) 1987￿1998   
IBJ Australia Bank 




Sample period  
Launceston Bank for Savings
(a)  1960￿1986  Merged with Tasmania Building Society to 
form Tasmania Bank 
Lloyds Bank NZA   1986￿1995   
Macquarie Bank
(a) 1986￿1999   
Mitsubishi Bank of Australia  1986￿1995  Merged with Bank of Tokyo 
National Australia Bank
(a) 1960￿1999   
National Mutual Royal Bank  1986￿1989   
NatWest Markets Australia  1986￿1996   
Primary Industry Bank of Australia  1979￿1987  Acquired by Rural and Industries Bank of 
Western Australia 
The Savings Bank of Tasmania
(a)  1960￿1990  Merged with Tasmania Bank to form Trust 
Bank 
St. George Bank  1993￿1998   




State Bank of South Australia
(a) 1960￿1992  
State Bank of Victoria
(a)  1960￿1990  Acquired by Commonwealth Bank 
Suncorp-Metway   1989￿1999   
Trust Bank  1991￿1998  Acquired by Colonial State Bank 
Westpac Banking Corporation
(a)  1960￿1999  Prior to 1982 operated as the Bank of  
New South Wales 
(a)  Included in panel regression.  




Share of interest in corporate income: Net interest payments of private,   
non-financial corporations as a share of private, non-financial corporations￿ gross 
operating surplus.  
Source: Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, 
ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
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Share of interest in household income: Household disposable income, interest 
payments ￿ consumer and housing. 
Sources: ABS Cat No 5206.0; ABS unpublished data. 
Real credit growth: Seasonally adjusted credit deflated by the gross domestic 
product implicit price deflator ￿ 1997/98=100, quarterly growth rate.  
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Table D.2; ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
Real GDP growth: Gross domestic product ￿ expenditure, average 1997/98 
prices, seasonally adjusted, chain-linked, quarterly growth rate.  
Source: ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
Real interest rate: 90-day bank bill rate deflated using the private consumption 
deflator over the previous four quarters.  
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Table F.1; ABS Cat No 5206.0.  
Commercial property price inflation: Quarterly growth in the implied price 
index derived from changes in the value of property assets held by property trusts. 
Source: ABS Cat No 5645.0. 
Share of construction in GDP: Private gross fixed capital expenditure (seasonally 
adjusted) as share of gross domestic product ￿ expenditure (seasonally adjusted). 
Source: ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
Share of construction (excluding property trust purchases) in GDP: Private 
gross fixed capital expenditure (seasonally adjusted) less gross purchases of 
property by listed and unlisted unit trusts as share of gross domestic   
product ￿ expenditure (seasonally adjusted). 
Sources: ABS Cat No 5206.0; ABS Cat No 5645.0. 34 
 
Annual data 
Share of interest in corporate income: Net interest payments of private,   
non-financial corporations over the financial year as a share of private,   
non-financial corporations￿ gross operating surplus.  
Source: ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
Real credit growth: Seasonally adjusted credit deflated by the gross domestic 
product implicit price deflator ￿ 1997/98=100, financial year year-on-year growth.  
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Table D.2; Foster (1996); ABS   
Cat No 5206.0. 
Residential property price inflation: Growth in annual (financial year) average 
price index.  
Sources: March 1960￿December 1969, Treasury; March 1970￿December 1981, 
Abelson (1983); March 1982￿June 1986, Real Estate Institute of Australia; 
September 1986￿December 1999, ABS. 
Real GDP growth: Gross domestic product ￿ expenditure, average 1997/98 
prices, seasonally adjusted, chain-linked, financial year year-on-year growth. 
Source: ABS Cat No 5206.0. 
Real interest rate: 10-year treasury bonds, end June, deflated using the consumer 
price index over the previous year. 
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Table F.2; Foster (1996). 
Share of construction in GDP: Private gross fixed capital expenditure over   
the financial year (seasonally adjusted) as share of gross domestic   
product ￿ expenditure (seasonally adjusted). 
Source: ABS Cat No 5206.0. 35 
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